Population Enumeration of Census 2027
Why in News?
Recently, the Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India (ORGI), has notified the schedule for the second phase of Census 2027, the Population Enumeration phase.
This time the questionnaire will have 40 questions, compared to 29 questions in the 2011 Census. Several new fields have been added, such as Aadhaar number, voter ID, mobile number, nationality, parents’ details, and bank account information.
While many of these questions can help in better demographic and socio-economic planning, questions have been raised about why such extensive personal information is being collected and whether it is necessary.
Major Concerns Regarding Census 2027 Population Enumeration
Census Becoming More Than a Statistical Exercise:
As per the UN, the census is meant to collect demographic, economic, and social data for planning. But the new questionnaire asks for parents’ birth details, nationality, Aadhaar, voter ID, passport, driving license, and mobile number, very similar to the National Population Register (NPR).
Critics fear that collecting parents’ details and nationality can shift the Census from counting people to profiling citizenship, which could help in creating an NRC.
The UN Principles of Official Statistics say individual data must be kept confidential and used only for statistics. Though the Census Act, 1948, provides for confidentiality, there is worry that data may be shared with NPR or other databases.
Methodological Flaws in Caste Enumeration:
For SC/ST, there will be a predefined list to choose from, but for other castes, including OBCs, the name will be written as declared by the person in an open-text box.
This can create confusion due to different spellings, local names, and sub-castes. In the 2011 Socio-Economic and Caste Census, this method produced around 46 lakh different caste names, which became impossible to analyze. Without proper standardization, we may get a lot of data but little use for policy.
Privacy Risks:
Details like Aadhaar, voter ID, passport, and Covid vaccination location have little use for overall planning. Census 2027 will be India’s first fully digital census with self-enumeration.
Storing so many IDs together in one central database increases the risk of data leaks, hacking, and de-anonymization.
Critics say this moves the Census from aggregate statistics to tracking individuals, which violates privacy and purpose limitation.
Respondent Fatigue and Practical Challenges:
A 40-question form is long. One person in the family may not know Aadhaar, parents’ details, or bank info of all members, leading to wrong or incomplete answers.
It will be even harder in hostels, PGs, and old-age homes where the manager may not have such details.5. Risk of Undercounting Migrants:
Census uses the de facto method of counting people where they are found on Census night. Many migrant workers may be away from their usual homes during that time and could be missed or counted at the wrong place.
What Measures are Needed to Ensure the Integrity of the Census?
Standardize Caste Data:
Instead of an open-text box where people write any caste name, there should be a standardized, pre-approved list with a drop-down option, made after proper consultation. This will avoid thousands of duplicate names and make the data usable.
Limit Non-Statistical Data:
The form should be simplified. There is no need to ask for Aadhaar, passport, or bank account numbers for a census. If the government wants to know about financial inclusion, a simple Yes/No question on whether the person has a bank account is enough.
Strengthen Data Verification:
A strong Post Enumeration Survey (PES) should be done after the Census to check for undercounting, wrong entries, and missed households, especially migrants.
Separate Census from NPR/NRC:
There must be a clear legal wall between Census and NPR/NRC. Census data should not be used for citizenship verification or tracking. This separation is needed to maintain people’s trust.
Robust Data Protection:
Since Census 2027 will be fully digital, strong cybersecurity is a must. Protocols under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, should be strictly followed to stop unauthorized access and prevent linking of Census data with other government databases.
Strengthen Cybersecurity:
End-to-end encryption, regular independent security audits, and strict access controls should be in place for the entire digital census system to prevent leaks and misuse of personal information.
Conclusion
Census is the backbone of India’s policymaking; it decides how funds are allocated, how welfare schemes are designed, and how reservations are planned. Its core strength lies in being a neutral, statistical exercise. Census 2027 is a big opportunity because it will be India’s first digital census and will include caste enumeration after a long gap. But this opportunity will only be useful if the data remains accurate, protected, and trusted by people.
For that, the questionnaire must be kept focused on statistical needs, caste data must be standardized, and there must be a clear legal separation between Census and NPR/NRC. Most importantly, strong data protection and cybersecurity under the DPDP Act, 2023, must be ensured. Only then will Census 2027 truly serve its purpose, counting people to empower people, not to profile them.
